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Recent Developments
Lessons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On Humanitarian Intervention
and Self-Determination. By Viola Trebicka
In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
intervened militarily in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to bring to
an end the grave humanitarian situation that the Serbian state had created in
Kosovo. More than seven years later, Kosovo is a "province," legally still part
of the Serbian state, though de facto separate from Serbia.' Kosovo is
currently under the administration of the United Nations Interim Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), though it has concurrently been building limited but
growing indigenous governmental institutions, in the form of the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The Kosovar Albanians, an
overwhelming 90% of the population of Kosovo's two million people,
demand the human right to self-determination, which, if achieved, would
certainly lead to Kosovo's secession. However, the Serbs of Kosovo and
politicians in Serbia, drawing on principles of sovereignty-among them,
territorial integrity-are reluctant to concede any sovereignty over Kosovo
and thus to approve of anything more than "substantial autonomy" for the
province. This conflict confirms what W. Michael Reisman has observed: that
there is a "fundamental contradiction [between] ... the legal principles of
state sovereignty and human rights,"2 both of which are securely established
by the U.N. Charter and international law, generally. This contradiction lies at
the heart of both the controversy over the legality of humanitarian intervention
and the post-intervention affairs.
The current risky situation in Kosovo demonstrates why the question of
self-determination in the circumstances of a humanitarian intervention needs
to be squarely addressed by a developing body of international humanitarian
law. More than seven years after the NATO intervention, Kosovo is still a
province with a suspended legal status, suffering from severe economic,
financial, and social uncertainty, which in turn breeds unemployment and lack
of foreign investment. Those governing Kosovo are of dubious democratic
legitimacy; various Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and not
elected officials, have created the law of the land. More importantly, Kosovo's
inhabitants are growing impatient with the delays and insecurities involved in
the process of developing a sustainable resolution of Kosovo's legal status,
creating a degree of volatility in the region that threatens to undo the benefits
1. It is worth mentioning that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 recognizes
the sovereignty of FRY over Kosovo and does not mention Serbia. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). However, when the FRY transformed into the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, the Constitutional Charter of the State Union stipulated that upon dissolution of the Union,
all duties having belonged previously to the FRY, especially with respect to Resolution 1244, would be
transferred to Serbia as the successor-state. CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA
AND MONTENEGRO art. 60, available at http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/const_scg.pdf.
2. W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 516, 517 (2004).
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of the original act of humanitarian intervention. 3 Riots in March of 2004-
fueled by frustration and fear over "the international community's intentions
for Kosovo, UNMIK's inability to kick-start the economy and its suspension
of privatisation, and Belgrade's success over recent months in shredding
Kosovo Albanian nerves"a4-left 19 dead, nearly 900 injured, and roughly
4500 people displaced. Increased anxiety over the Status Talks fueled another
demonstration of a few thousand people in Prigtina/Prishtind on November 28,
2006, the Albanian national flag day, led by the Vetdvendosja ("Self-
Determination") movement. The demonstration, at which the crowd smashed
windows and threw paint at government buildings, had to be contained by
police use of teargas.
The Status Talks
The Security Council Resolution that established the international
presence in Kosovo does not mention self-determination, but rather autonomy
and self-government. 6 Recognizing the need for the eventual settlement of the
legal status of Kosovo, the Resolution provides for a "political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future status."7 To commence this "political
process," the Security Council in late 2005 authorized the Secretary-General's
appointment of former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, to head a process
that would determine the status of Kosovo by the end of 2006.8 Though not
completely stalled, the process has been delayed. Since July 2006,
representatives from the Serbian government (including representatives of
Kosovo Serbs), the Kosovo delegation (including opposition representatives),
and the so-called Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have been meeting to
decide on a peaceful settlement of the question of Kosovo. The overall
framework for the future status, as set by the Contact Group in January 2006,
contains "three no's": no return to the status Kosovo had until 1999, no union
with any other country, and no partition. The Contact Group has also
intimated that the future status should be, "inter alia, acceptable to the people
of Kosovo." 9 A brokered political agreement, however, has proven much
more elusive than was first thought. In fact, on November 10, 2006, Ahtisaari
issued a statement further postponing even the mere presentation of his
3. See LULZIM PE(CI, ILIR DUGOLLI & LEON MALAZOGU, NEGOTIATING Kosovo's FINAL
STATUS 3 (2006) (commenting on the vague and conflicting mandate of the international administration
in Kosovo with, on the one hand "substantial autonomy as provided by UNSCR 1244 and[, on the
other,] state-building aspirations of ... Kosovo's elite and its overwhelming majority.").
4. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, COLLAPSE IN Kosovo, EUROPE REPORT No. 155, at i
(2004) [hereinafter CRISIS GROUP, COLLAPSE].
5. Kosovo Protesters Attack UN Site, BBC NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
l/hi/world/europe/6193464.stm.
6. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
7. Id.
8. The Security Council also established the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of
the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo (UNOSEK) in Vienna to support the
activities of Mr. Ahtisaari.
9. See Statement, Kosovo Contact Group (Jan. 31, 2006), http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/
emsData/docs/pressdata/EN/ declarations/88236.pdf.
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proposed settlement to the Security Council until after the Serbian
parliamentary elections on January 21, 2007.
The developments of the Status Talks have been shrouded in mystery.
Discussions are neither published nor public and no effort has been made to
involve any wide spectrum of the population on either side of the UNMIK
border. It was only in late October 2006 that a member of the Contact Group
leaked Mr. Ahtisaari's draft proposals to the Kosovar media.10 The goal of the
United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the
future status process for Kosovo (UNOSEK) when it commenced work in
early 2006 was to bring to a convergence the views of officials in
Prigtina/Prishtind and Belgrade, respectively, on the so-called "'technical'
aspects of Kosovo's status package: decentralization, minority community
rights, protection of cultural and religious sites, and "untangling competing
claims on state property and debt between Kosovo and Serbia."' l The final
package would be approved by a resolution of the Security Council. The talks
have proven quite arduous and ridden with conflict. There is much on which
Prigtina/Prishtind and Belgrade do not agree, but the two main sticking points
are the constitutional status of Kosovo and the question of its territorial
partition.
The Constitutional Status of Kosovo
The burden of declaring the province severed from Serbia (or, in more
controversial parlance, declaring it "independent") would fall on the Security
Council's final resolution--endorsing Ahtisaari's package, winding down
UNMIK, and establishing the details of a successor international presence-
and a declaration of the elected assembly of Kosovo. Ahtisaari's package will
most likely avoid the controversial label "independence," a term vigorously
opposed by Serbia. However, Ahtisaari's proposal could potentially amount to
independence in substance. 12 Virtually ignoring Serbia's new constitution
declaring Kosovo to be an "integral" part of the country, 13 the package
implicitly severs Kosovo from any constitutional relationship with Serbia.
Kosovo would have treaty-making powers, meaning that it could join the
IMF, and other international bodies, including the United Nations itself.
14
However, the proposal is unlikely to mandate explicitly the creation of a
foreign ministry or a U.N. seat. A wide range of international community
prerogatives, such as the creation of an UNMIK-successor office with
10. One constant source of information on the talks has been the International Crisis Group
(ICG), an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization. ICG, with nearly 120 staff members
on five continents, works through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve
deadly conflict. Known for its quality and thorough work, it has received much praise, notably, from
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. For more
information, see http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/. ICG has regularly produced reports on Kosovo. It
recently published an in-depth expos6 of the situation in Kosovo and the development of the Status
Talks, building on information gathered from the media as well as interviews with members of the
respective delegations and the Contact Group members. CRISIS GROUP, COLLAPSE, supra note 4.
11. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Kosovo STATUS: DELAY IS RISKY, EUROPE REPORT
N'177, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter CRISIS GROUP, Kosovo STATUS].
12. See id. at 3.
13. William J. Kole, Serbia Shrinks, Sinks into Dejection, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2006.
14. See CRISIS GROUP, Kosovo STATUS, supra note 11, at 3.
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substantial powers, under the umbrella of European Union, will almost
certainly be implemented.
The Question of Partition
The issue of minority community rights is of utmost importance, given
the Contact Group's implicit understanding that "the main purpose of the
Vienna process has been to find a viable future for Kosovo Serbs within an
independent Kosovo."' 15 Though much remains to be done, the PISG have
made consistent and good-faith efforts to fulfill the standards set by the
international community, among which are minority rights, at least as far as
legal guarantees are concerned.' 6 In the Status Talks, the trickiest issue is
Serb-dominated northern Kosovo and its administrative center, the town of
Mitrovicd/Mitrovica. If independence is insisted on, the Serbian fallback
position is to partition Kosovo, absorbing northern Kosovo and
Mitrovicd/Mitrovica into Serbia. However, the Kosovar Albanian position
deems such a solution unacceptable, as it would mean severing close to a fifth
of Kosovo's 4213 square miles. UNOSEK seems to stand behind the
international community's repeated assertion that Kosovo will not be
partitioned, as it has treated Mitrovicd/Mitrovica and the north generally with
the rest of the decentralization questions.
Though the international community and the Western Contact Group
members, in particular, have repeatedly expressed their support for some sort
of independence for a non-partitioned Kosovo, the political process provided
by the Security Council's Resolution 1244 is proving cumbersome, and its in-
built delays, dangerous. Serbia, backed by the Russian veto in the Security
Council, is actively trying to delay any compromised outcome indefinitely,
possibly for domestic political gains. In fact, frustrated with Belgrade's
uncompromising positions, Ahtisaari's July and September 2006 Reports to
the Security Council criticized Belgrade for its inflexibility while giving
Prigtina/Prishtin credit for making concessions and being cooperative.'
7
Even though the Albanian delegation in the Vienna talks has proven
accommodating, the Kosovar population at large is much less patient. The
Kosovar Assembly has threatened to declare independence unilaterally, once
in 2003 and again in 2005, but has pulled back both times. 18 Indeed, the
Kosovar Albanians have some tradition of self-government. After 1989, when
Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomy, the Kosovar Albanians created an
extensive and functioning parallel government. 19 An illicitly elected Kosovar
Assembly first declared its independence in 1991, albeit only recognized by
the Republic of Albania. Thus, Kosovo has been moving forward with self-
government for quite some time. Complicating matters further, anxiety has
15. See id.
16. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2206/707
(Sept. 1, 2006).
17. See CRISIS GROUP, KOSOvO STATUS, supra note 11, at 3.
18. Id. at 1.
19. The nature of this parallel government was quite unique: It held elections, ran Albanian-
language schools, raised taxes, provided healthcare, and more. MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND
ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KoSovo 259 (1998).
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seized many segments of Kosovar society. The "Vetdvendosja" movement has
drawn in many young and well-educated people as a result-people impatient
with the lack of democratic accountability and the deplorable political
situation. More alarming is that in the event of further delays of the Status
Talks, there is the potential for reaction by those segments of the population
affiliated with the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). These include
both war veterans and certain organized political parties that could use
popular discontent to cause an uprising or revolt in the face of status
uncertainties.
The Dilemma of the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention
The lawfulness of NATO's 1999 humanitarian intervention in the FRY
was widely discussed and questioned at the time. The debate continues.
NATO did not have the Security Council's explicit authorization to intervene
militarily in a sovereign state (FRY), even though that state was engaged in
the widespread violation of the human rights of its own citizens, who were
ethnic minorities (Albanian) confined to a single province (Kosovo).
However, the Security Council had previously condemned the human rights
violations being perpetrated in Kosovo. 20 Furthermore, neither the Security
Council, nor the General Assembly, nor the Secretary-General condemned the
intervention as a violation of the legal principle of state sovereignty, 21 though
these institutions had done so on previous occasions of intervention.2 2
The legality of humanitarian intervention remains uncertain, 23 due to the
24unresolved conflict between human rights and state sovereignty. However,
the egregious human rights violations of recent years have taught us that
humanitarian interventions are a critical tool for alleviating human suffering,
and that the international community does not (or should not) always see state
sovereignty as more sacred than human life. Some now go so far as to argue
that sovereignty should be refashioned as a state's responsibility for human
life within its borders.25 International actors are paying increasing attention to
an emerging norm in international customary law that would legitimize and
codify humanitarian intervention law.26 The profile of these efforts was raisedby an official recognition in the High Level Panel report, A More Secure
20. See S.C. Res. 1239 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res.1199, U.N. Doe. S/RES/I 199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
21. See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 238 (J.L.
Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003).
22. For example, the U.S. interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-1990) were
condemned by the General Assembly as a violation of international law. See also SEAN D. MURPHY,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 83-144 (1996).
23. See SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS & COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY (2005); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS
(J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003); SEAN MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1996).
24. Reisman, supra note 2.
25. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001).
26. See id.; INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KosoVo, KosoVo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000).
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World, commissioned by the U.N. Secretary-General. The report identified an
emerging international norm of a "responsibility to protect" when faced with
humanitarian disasters, a responsibility vested in the international collective
but exercisable by the Security Council.27
Self-Determination in the Aftermath of a Humanitarian Intervention
A related issue, becoming thornier by the day, has compounded this
topic: What happens after the humanitarian intervention? By virtue of having
intervened, the international community has taken upon itself certain
responsibilities extending into the period after the intervention. 28 Walter
Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst have called the notion that intervention does not
affect domestic politics an illusion. 29 As Susan Breau recognizes, the United
Nations may have implied powers to engage in nation building after an
intervention, but "[it] also ha[s] a responsibility to develop clear legal
guidelines for such an endeavor" lest it become a colonial power. 30 The
present precarious situation in Kosovo should counsel the international
community that any further elucidations on international humanitarian
intervention law would be woefully deficient absent accounting for the
aftermath of the intervention.
What is to become of Kosovo? The principle of state sovereignty and its
corollary of territorial integrity is the cornerstone of the Westphalian system.
Just as importantly, self-determination is now "considered a general principle
of international law." 31 In the case of Kosovo, the exercise of self-
determination would certainly lead to secession, thus violating the principle of
territorial integrity of the sovereign, Serbia. In this case, I argue that emerging
international law should favor the right to self-determination over sovereignty
claims. The legitimacy of the sovereignty claims upon which self-
determination would infringe has been discredited already by virtue of the
decision to intervene in the first place. In the case of Kosovo, the Serbian
government had an extensive record of violating the human rights of the
Albanian population, corroding their claims to sovereignty over Kosovo. 3 2 A
consensus-based political process in the case of Kosovo has allowed the
political elite of a state previously condemned for human rights violations to
hold hostage the prosperity and stability of the people whom they have
wronged. The drawbacks of this scenario are clear in Kosovo's uncertain and
risky political process. The international community must build the tools to
engage the question of self-determination in order to ensure as direct a route
to reconstruction and return to normality as possible in the aftermath of future
27. Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More
Secure World, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A159/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
28. See THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 25, at xi (arguing for a responsibility to
rebuild and "addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.").
29. Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, 75
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 70, 74 (1996).
30. SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS & COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY 362 (2005).
31. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 194 (W. Michael Reisman et al. eds., 2004).
32. This is evidenced in several Security Council Resolutions. See supra note 20.
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humanitarian interventions.
Small States, Big Veto: Customary International Law in the WTO After
EC-Biotech. By Mark Wu
As the expanse of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) jurisprudence
grows, so too does the potential for conflict with customary international law.
For the past six years, the accepted relationship between the two was that laid
out in the Korea-Government Procurement dispute: "[C]ustomary
international law ... applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do
not 'contract out' from it."1 In other words, provided there is no inconsistency
between what is accepted as customary international law and WTO law,
generally recognized principles of international law can supplement gaps in
the WTO Agreements. Subsequently, several WTO decisions appeared to
reinforce this principle.
This era of harmony between customary international law and WTO law
may be coming to a close, due to a recent WTO panel decision that has
arguably raised the bar for what may count as a "rule of international law" in
the WTO context. The Panel's decision in the EC-Biotech dispute, publicly
issued on September 29, 2006, suggested that in order for a "rule of
international law" to be considered in a WTO dispute, that rule must have
been ratified by all parties of the WTO agreement being interpreted.2 This
Recent Development argues that this narrowing of the definition of applicable
customary international law is a step too far, and explores potential
alternatives to the standard endorsed by the EC-Biotech Panel.
At the heart of the EC-Biotech dispute, ongoing since May 2003, are
two European Community (EC) directives regulating the approval of biotech
products. One regulates the "deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms," while the other regulates "novel foods and
novel food ingredients." 3 Both directives are based on the notion of the
precautionary principle: that is, if there is the potential for severe or
irreversible consequences, the burden should rest on biotech producers to
show that their products are safe before product authorization is granted. This
approach runs counter to the standard in other developed countries where a
regulatory agency must have some scientific evidence of a potential harmful
effect before it can deny product approval. In addition, several European
countries enacted their own import restrictions on biotech products.
The United States, Canada, and Argentina cried foul. Along with fifteen
other countries,4 they alleged that these European standards constituted a de
1. Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 7.96,
WT/DSI63/R (May 1, 2000).
2. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Products, 7.68-7.70, WTIDS291-293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Panel Report, Ec-
Biotech].
3. Council Directive 2001/18, pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 258/97,
pmbl., 1997 O.J. (L 043) 1 (EC).
4. The third-party countries that joined this dispute are Australia, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Chinese Taipei (i.e.,
Taiwan), Thailand, and Uruguay. See Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 2, 1.13.
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facto moratorium on approval of biotech products. 5 This represented an undue
delay in violation of the WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") as well as several other WTO
provisions. In its defense, the Europeans turned to two treaties: the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity (the "CBD"), and the 2000 Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the
"Biosafety Protocol").
Within the Biosafety Protocol are specific provisions allowing for the
application of the precautionary principle to biotech products. These
provisions note that a party to the Protocol should not be prevented from
enacting trade restrictions simply because of the "[f]ack of scientific certainty
due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding
the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity .... ."6 Instead, parties
are permitted to take "into account risks to human health" and enact
precautionary restrictions "as appropriate ... in order to avoid or minimize
such potential adverse effects."7
Essentially, the Europeans argued that their regulations were consistent
with their WTO obligations because the Biosafety Protocol is customary
international law that complements WTO law. According to Article 31 (3)(c)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty interpretation should
take into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." 8 The question for the WTO was whether the
CBD and the Biosafety Protocol met the requirements necessary to constitute
a "relevant rule of international law."
The Panel in EC-Biotech ruled that it did not. It agreed that, in theory, a
treaty such as the CBD and its subsequent Biosafety Protocol could qualify as
a rule under Article 31(3)(c). 9 But it then applied a strict textualist
interpretation of this Article. According to the Panel's interpretation, in order
to qualify as a rule, the treaty or customary international law must be
"applicable in the relations between the WTO members."' 0 The Panel clarified
that this did not simply mean "one or more parties."'' Nor did it mean just the
"parties to the dispute."'1 2 Rather, the Panel declared that "it makes sense to
interpret Article 31(3)(c) as requiring consideration of those rules of
international law which are applicable in the relations between all parties to
5. See id. 4.10.
6. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 10.6,
11.8, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-
en.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
9. See Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 2, 7.67 ("In our view, there can be no doubt
that treaties and customary rules of international law are 'rules of international law' within the meaning
of Article 31(3)(c).").




the treaty which is being interpreted." '3 Essentially, the Panel appears to
suggest that before a principle of customary international law can be applied
in interpreting WTO law, it must be embraced by all WTO members.
In this case, the net result was that neither the CBD nor the Biosafety
Protocol met the Panel's requirement. At the time of the Panel decision, the
CBD had been joined by 189 countries, including all parties to the dispute, but
not yet ratified by the United States.' 4 Therefore, the Panel ruled that the CBD
"is not 'applicable' in the relations between the United States and all other
WTO Members."'15 The same was true of the Biosafety Protocol, which only
135 countries had ratified at the time of the decision.' 6 Of the complaining
parties, Argentina and Canada had both signed but not ratified the Protocol,
while the United States had not even signed it. The Europeans emphasized
that the Americans nevertheless participated in the Protocol's Clearing-House
Mechanism, 17 but the Panel concluded that this was not enough. Based on
these facts, the Panel "deduced" that the Biosafety Protocol was also "not
'applicable' in the relations between ... WTO Members."' 8 As a result, the
Panel refused to consider principles contained within the CBD and the
Biosafety Protocol in resolving this dispute.
The Panel ruling in EC-Biotech represents a significant departure from
past WTO practice. In previous cases, the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) was
more than willing to consider treaties that it viewed as constituting customary
international law-but that were not necessarily signed by all WTO
members-in determining the meaning of WTO law. For example, in the
Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body turned to the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to determine the scope of the term "natural
resources."'19 At the time of the decision, UNCLOS had been ratified by 126
countries, but not by the United States, which was a party to the dispute.20 In
that sense, UNCLOS's status was no different than the CBD's or Biosafety
Protocol's status in EC-Biotech. In addition, the WTO has also been willing
to turn to bilateral and regional trade agreements entered into by select parties
13. Id. f 7.70 (emphasis added). Note, however, that in 1 7.72, the Panel explicitly states that
it is not taking a position on the scenario "in which relevant rules of international law are applicable to
all parties to the dispute, but not all WTO members, and in which all parties to the dispute argue that a
multilateral WTO agreement should be interpreted in light of these other rules of international law."
14. See U.N.E.P. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Parties to the
Convention on Biodiversity / Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp.
15. Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 2, 7.74.
16. See U.N.E.P. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (Montreal, 29 January 2000), Status of Ratifications and Entry into Force,
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts-rtf&ord=ctr.
17. The Clearing-House Mechanism is a mechanism coordinated by the U.N. Environment
Programme to promote and facilitate the exchange of information related to biodiversity. For more
information on the Mechanism, see U.N.E.P. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Clearing House Mechanism, http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx.
18. Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 2, 7.75.
19. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
20. See U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Status of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/status2006.pdf.
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as a "supplementary means of interpretation," 21 or "for the purpose of
interpreting an ambiguous WTO provision." 22 In fact, the prevailing principle
has been to apply customary rules so long as there is "no conflict or
inconsistency" with the WTO agreements.
23
This leads to two interesting questions. First, how did the EC-Biotech
Panel distinguish this case from past precedents? The Panel never addresses
this question head-on. The only place where the EC-Biotech Panel discusses
the consistency of its ruling with other WTO decisions is in a footnote, and
even there, it focuses only on its consistency with those WTO decisions that
interpret the Vienna Convention's Article 31(3). 24 It simply ignores
Shrimp/Turtle, Korea-Government Procurement, and other cases where the
WTO embraced international law more generally in interpreting its own law.
Were the Panel to attempt to distinguish its ruling, it might have made
the following type of argument. In Shrimp/Turtle, Korea-Government
Procurement, Korea-Beef and other cases, the Appellate Body turned to
customary international law simply to help it resolve the meaning of an
ambiguous term in WTO law. In this case, however, the Europeans were not
asking the Panel to rely on the CBD or the Biosafety Protocol to resolve the
meaning of a term in the SPS Agreement. Instead, they were asking the Panel
to import a legal principle from another international agreement-the
precautionary principle-into WTO law. The Panel could have argued that
this task is inherently different from simply turning to customary international
law as an interpretive aid. Such a delineation would have been helpful in
establishing how EC-Biotech could coexist with previous WTO precedents
that embraced international treaties to which not every WTO member
belonged. This distinction is never made, however. Indeed, the entire question
of whether the EC-Biotech panel ruling is to co-exist with previous WTO
precedents, and if so how, is simply glossed over.
The second unresolved question is why the Panel chose to raise the bar.
Why did it now require that all WTO members embrace a rule of international
law before it could be considered when previous adjudicators had not? On this
question, the EC-Biotech Panel provides a clear response. It explicitly states
that its actions are designed to "ensure[] or enhance[] the consistency of the
rules of international law applicable to .. . States and thus contribute[] to
avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules.' 25 In other words, the Panel
seeks to avoid creating a scenario whereby a state finds itself bound, in a
WTO forum, by an international rule to which it had not yet chosen to bind
itself through ratification. Its vision is thus of a pure "opt-in" system rather
than of any imposition of customary international law on states by multilateral
legal institutions.
21. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products, 83, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998).
22. Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting the Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef
539, WT/DS161/R (July 31, 2000).
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. See Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 2, p. 333 n.243 (focusing on how its
interpretation is similar to the Appellate Body's interpretation of the meaning of "the parties" in Article
31 (3)(b) in EC-Chicken Cuts.).
25. Id. f 7.70.
Recent Developments
This vision has generated a considerable backlash from the small
community of international law scholars that has scrutinized it. For a
multilateral body prone to diplomatic language, the U.N. General Assembly's
International Law Commission (ILC) was sharply critical. It noted that the
new standard "makes it practically impossible ever to find a multilateral
context where reference to other multilateral treaties as aids to interpretation
under Article 31(3)(c) would ever be allowed., 26 The ILC then proceeded to
criticize the WTO Panel for willingly undoing "the consistency of the
multilateral treaty system as a whole" simply to "buy[] what it calls the
'consistency' of its interpretation of the WTO treaty." 2 7 It condemned the
decision as effectively rendering the WTO agreements isolated "'islands'
permitting no references inter se in their application. 28
The EC-Biotech Panel standard is prone to two further criticisms as
well. First, it creates a single-party veto, for so long as a single party holds
out, that party can effectively veto the application of customary international
law to WTO law. This single-party veto system already applies to some
aspects of the WTO regime (e.g., the admission of new members), but to give
a single small state the power to eliminate any role for customary international
law in the WTO is extreme. Adjudicators should be given some flexibility in
interpreting ambiguous texts, and that flexibility should include the ability to
turn to other widely-accepted international legal texts as interpretive aids.
Second, the standard creates an additional barrier for admitting new
members to the WTO. Existing members are now more likely to scrutinize the
set of treaties to which an applicant is a party. This gives existing members
greater leverage to demand that the applicant ratify certain treaties as a
condition of accession, because if it did not, admitting that member would
make that treaty inoperative in the WTO context. The price of WTO
admission-already high--continues to increase.
What then should be done to fix this problematic standard created by the
EC-Biotech Panel? The United Nations's ILC Report suggests that the
answer lies in changing the standard to permit reference to another treaty so
long as all parties in the dispute are also parties to the other treaty. 29 This
proposal has its own problems, however. Consider, for example, a multilateral
treaty that has been ratified by only ten countries. Under this proposal, the
WTO could consider the principles to be customary international law in a
WTO dispute where all the parties are among the treaty's ten signatories. But
should a principle be recognized as such if it is embraced by so few
countries--or alternatively, only by OECD countries, or ASEAN countries?
A better alternative would be for the WTO to set a numerical threshold
that answers the question of when the principles in another multilateral
agreement can be considered customary international law under Article
3 1(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. This threshold could be when a majority
26. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 450, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
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of WTO members have ratified the treaty. Or the threshold could be set even
higher, for example, at two-thirds of members. A threshold approach provides
a clear and straightforward means of informing all parties of when another
non-WTO agreement could be incorporated into WTO jurisprudence.
Second, the WTO should continue to require that all parties to the
dispute be parties to the agreement-as both the EC-Biotech Panel and the
United Nations's ILC have urged. By preventing the multilateral regime from
imposing new international legal obligations on parties that have not
consented to them, this principle eliminates a likely threat to the long-term
stability and legitimacy of the WTO. This rule should be a default, subject to
waiver by disputants who have not ratified the non-WTO treaty being
considered but who nevertheless agree to its application in a particular WTO
dispute. This is likely to occur when a principle of customary international
law works in the disputant's favor, despite the fact that the disputant has yet to
embrace that specific principle. The United States faced this precise
circumstance in Shrimp/Turtle. It had not signed or ratified UNCLOS, and yet,
the UNCLOS interpretation clearly cut in its favor. Under such circumstances,
the WTO adjudicators would ask the non-signatory whether it was nonetheless
willing to accept certain provisions of the treaty at hand to be customary
international law. Provided it would do so (or had done so in a previous
dispute), the WTO would then apply those provisions as a rule under Article
31(3)(c). In the long run, providing such an exception should foster the
gradual expansion of customary international law. It creates incentives for
states to openly acknowledge that certain parts of treaties are indeed
customary international law, without needing to accede to a controversial
treaty as a whole.
Were EC-Biotech and the earlier WTO precedents judged by this
proposed standard, the outcomes would remain unchanged. In EC-Biotech,
the WTO would still deem the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol to be
inapplicable, but simply because those instruments had not reached the
specified threshold to be considered as customary international law. On the
other hand, UNCLOS and other multilateral treaties previously embraced by
the WTO would meet the standard, and they have therefore been correctly
applied previously by the Appellate Body.
The above proposal guarantees greater consistency and predictability
regarding circumstances in which the WTO may turn to customary
international law for gap-filling, without advancing the stark requirement of
the EC-Biotech Panel that every single WTO member embrace the rule in
question. Nor does the proposal in this Recent Development pose the problem
inherent in the ILC's proposal, namely that WTO panels should consider rules
not widely embraced by its members as customary international law. The
proposal also eliminates the destabilizing threat of a single-party veto, and
does not impact accession decisions in most instances. In other words, it
accomplishes the Panel's goals, but through more constructive means.
In today's interdependent world, where multiple fora exist for creating
international law, the EC-Biotech Panel's standard-that law established in a
different forum must be embraced by all WTO members before it can be
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considered for incorporation-is simply unrealistic. Behavior need not be
embraced by all before it becomes custom. The same should be true of
international law. Retaining the Panel's unrealistic standard will effectively
isolate the WTO regime from other bodies of international law. Undoing this
standard should be near the top of the Appellate Body's future agenda.

